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Sudden stops seem to create the perfect environment for disinflation, 
especially when central banks defend the exchange rate by increasing 
interest rates. We propose a variation of the output gap model that 
incorporates the sudden stop shock. The use of the model in policy 
analysis shows that  fear of floating is pro-cyclical and inflation 
targeting, counter-cyclical. The model is run for Brazil, Colombia, 
Korea and Thailand, the inflation targeting countries that have 
recently had sudden stops. The three policy implications direct 
attention to the medium and long run. First, the central banks that 
are  targeting inflation  should focus on inflation, not during but 
after the sudden stop. Second, they could complement this medium term 
view by monitoring a measure of inflation of non traded goods. Third, 
the monetary authorities could eventually introduce an escape clause 
to the CPI inflation target under a sharp depreciation. 
 
JEL classification: E3; E58; F3; F41; F42; F47 
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I.  Introduction 
 
An increasing number of central banks have made a commitment to 
maintaining inflation on target. Yet, sudden stops cause large 
depreciations, which are sizable enough to leave central banks 
unable to fulfill the commitment. After available international 
reserves have been spent, central banks face a dilemma: whether 
or not to increase interest rates. If they increase interest 
rates, there i s  a  smaller  pass-through to inflation  but 
monetary policy is pro-cyclical.  If  they  do not,  the  pass-
through is bigger and monetary policy is not pro-cyclical. 
 
The paper attempts to address the following questions: during a 
sudden stop, what are the consequences of central bank policy 
on inflation and output? During a crisis in the capital account 
of the balance of payments, can  a central bank  that targets 
inflation move interest rates counter-cyclically? 
   3
We have three objectives in this paper. The first one, to show 
that policy need not be pro-cyclical if policymakers look 
beyond the short run. The second one, to state another stylized 
fact about sudden stops: the behavior of inflation. The third 
objective is to develop the output gap model that is popular 
among central banks. We develop the output gap  model by 
incorporating a sudden stop shock, by exploiting the model in 
policy analysis under a sudden stop, and by using it to 
rationalize the recent crisis in emerging markets. 
 
Whether  a  central bank can move interest rates  counter-
cyclically under a sudden stop is the same question  faced by 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). In their paper, if I may be 
permitted an oversimplification, under inflation targeting, the 
central bank allows the  exchange rate to  float freely; this 
decreases the demand for imported investment, which  in turn 
decreases the interest rate.  Under fear of floating, the 
central bank stabilizes the exchange rate.  A stable exchange 
rate increases both the demand for imported investment and the 
interest rate.  They conclude that, inflation targeting is 
counter-cyclical and fear of floating, pro-cyclical. 
 
Based on different theory, we also obtain the same conclusion, 
-that inflation targeting is counter-cyclical and fear of 
floating, pro-cyclical. Inflation targeting is counter-cyclical 
because in the medium term the sudden stop creates the forces 
which decrease inflation. If central bank policy looks beyond 
the short term, the central bank is able to decrease interest 
rates. In our model fear of floating is pro-cyclical because, 
as the central bank tightens the stance of monetary policy, it   4
emphasizes the recessive effect of the increase in bond 
spreads. 
 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) show that many floating regimes are 
floating in name only.  In reality, countries move interest 
rates and international reserves to stabilize the exchange 
rate.
 3 The scope of this paper includes the role of interest 
rate policy in stabilizing the exchange rate.  It does not 
include other policies available for dealing with a sudden stop 
such as the management of international reserves, the increase 
in foreign credit, the development of the local derivatives and 
securities markets, and foreign liability management 
operations. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: I n  the second 
section, t he  stylized facts of sudden stops are dealt with, 
especially in regards to the behavior of inflation and to the 
stance of  monetary policy. In sections three to six, the two 
models  that were used are spelled out: the output gap model, 
and the model for estimating the output gap. In these sections 
I explain what I mean, in the output gap model, by sudden stop, 
inflation targeting and fear of floating. In section seven, the 
central section,  a sudden stop  is simulated  under  both 
inflation targeting and fear of floating and, from this, some 
of the central conclusions of the paper are obtained. In the 
                                                 
3 Goldstein (2002) defends the use of international reserves during a sudden 
stop under the name of managed floating plus. Allen et. al. (2003), in turn, 
explain central bank intervention on the grounds that it enables the public 
sector to insure the balance sheet of the private sector.    5
last two sections, the policy implications are dealt with, and 
some conclusions are drawn. 
 
   
II.  Another Stylized Fact: the Behavior of Inflation  
 
A sudden stop is a decrease in capital inflow, with 
repercussions on higher exchange rates,  lower  output, 
disorderly  increases in net exports,  reserves looses,  and 
increases in  bond  spreads and interest rates. Calvo (1998), 
Calvo and Reinhart (1999), Gosh et. al. (2002) and Lahiri and 
Végh (2002) have shown some of the stylized facts of sudden 
stops. More recently, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) have 
shown other empirical facts about sudden stops such as their 
association with large depreciations specifically in the case 
of emerging markets, and their tendency “to come in bunches (of 
countries).” 
 
The 1997-1998 crisis in Asia and the 1998-1999 crisis in Latin 
America were characterized not only by a decrease in capital 
inflows, but also  by  bank runs and  by  collapses  in bank 
lending, and in real  estate prices.  These  crises  were more 
complex than the mere fall in capital inflow.
4 
  
In contrast, in June and July 2002 the fall in capital inflows 
in Brazil and Colombia did not seem to have their origin in 
financial excesses but in an exogenous event, the increase in 
the high yield spread in the US.  Whatever the variety of 
                                                 
4 In the language of Kaminsky (2003), these were “crisis of financial 
excesses.”   6
currency crisis, whether it is a mere sudden stop in capital 
inflow or a complex financial crisis, bond spreads seem to have 
increased in all cases (Figure 1). 
 
What in Kaminsky’s terms are “currency crises” are called here 
the sudden stops of 1997-1999 and 2002 and are captured in the 
model by an increase in bond spreads. As Figure 1 makes clear, 
bond spreads increased in the four countries under study  in 
1997-1999 and in Brazil and Colombia in 2002. 
 
Different studies of sudden stops and currency crises have 
described the behavior of the exchange rate, output, net 
exports and other variables. Nothing has been said so far about 
the primary goal variable of inflation targeting central banks. 
It is one of our main findings that a sudden stop leads to a 
sharp, short term increase in inflation due to pass-through and 
a  to  smaller but permanent decrease in inflation after  a 
recession. We show the stylized facts of inflation in Figures 2 
and 3. This paper will frame this behavior of inflation into 
the output gap model. 
 
In regards to the behavior of other variables, a sudden stop 
implies a decrease in the output gap and an increase in net 
exports. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the effect of the sudden stop 




                                                 
5 Incidentally, a little algebraic work with macroeconomic identities would 
show that a decrease in the output gap and an increase in net exports imply 
a sharp decrease in demand or absorption.    7
What about monetary policy?  Recall  the fact  that Brazil and 
Colombia defended somewhat flexible crawling bands in 1998 and 
operated under inflation targeting in 2002. During the 1998-
1999 crisis, and u sing interest rates as an indicator of 
monetary policy, Figure 4 indicates that the central banks in 
Brazil and Colombia  increased  interest rates sharply;  this 
stance is pro-cyclical. 
 
In 2002  Colombia did not  increase interest rates;  Brazil, 
however, did it.
6 The reason for the increase in interest rates 
in Brazil must have been not the defense of the exchange rate 
but  the targeting of  inflation:  ''The members of the Copom 
emphasized that, in spite of the relevance of recent exchange 
rate depreciation to the rise in inflation expectations, 
monetary policy continues to be calibrated exclusively to 
maintain inflation in a trajectory within the targeted range; 
therefore, monetary policy does not aim at targeting the 
exchange rate level.'' (Minutes of the Copom October 2002). 
 
Rogoff (2003) has recently pointed out that the fall in 
inflation around the world is a consequence not only of better 
central bank policy, but also of other factors such as 
globalization, increased productivity, competition, and 
deregulation, among others. We would like to add another factor 
to this list. Brazil, Colombia and Thailand adopted inflation 
targeting after the sudden stop (Figure 1, Table 1).
7 The large 
                                                 
6 Haussman, Paniza and Stein (1999) point to a parallel comparison for the 
cases of Mexico and Australia in 1998.  
7 Central banks did not have the modeling tools to asses the effect of the 
increase in interest rates on inflation. As noted below, output gap models   8
decreases in inflation in these and  also in other countries 
also seem to be a  byproduct of the defense of the crawling 
bands.  Inflation targeting still awaits its toughest proof: 
central banks will eventually have to contain demand, and the 




III.  Incorporating the  Sudden Stop Shock into the Output 
Gap Model 
 
Increasingly,  central banks  use the output gap model for 
forecasting and policy analysis.  In its many variations, the 
output gap model appears in the papers published by McCallum 
and Nelson (1999), Svensson (2000),  Hargraves (1999), De 
Freitas and Kfoury (2000), Beechey, Meredidth, Bharucha, 
Cagliarini, Gruen and Thompson (2000), Martinez, Sánchez and 
Werner (2001), Gómez and Julio (2000), De Fiore (1998), Ha, 
Leung and Shu (2002)), and Coats, Laxton and Rose (2003). The 
version in this paper includes the sudden stop shock and its 
effect on aggregate demand and the exchange rate.  
 
Diagram 1 depicts the  mechanics of the  model.
8  Consider a  
steady state where inflation is on target, the interest rate is 
in equilibrium and the output gap is zero (the three shaded 
rectangles). If the inflation forecast  increases above  the 
                                                                                                                                                          
in emerging markets were available after the 1998-1999 crisis. In Colombia, 
after the 1999 crisis, the autoregressive inflation models then available 
showed structural breaks. 
8 Variables are in rectangles, behavioral equations in circles and the shock 
in the dashed line circle.   9
inflation target (see the shaded rectangle in the top right of 
the diagram), the central bank increases interest rates, which 
activates the three transmission channels of monetary policy: 
the aggregate demand channel (gross line), and the direct and 
indirect exchange rate channels (dashed and dotted lines). 
  
The sudden stop has two immediate effects. First, it causes a 
short lived increase in inflation through the direct exchange 
rate channel. Although the pass-through is small, if exchange 
rate depreciation is large enough,  inflation may  increase 
jeopardizing the inflation target.  Second, t he sudden stop 
decreases demand.  
 
The most permanent  and hence important  effect of the sudden 
stop on inflation and output depends on central bank policy. As 
we argue throughout this paper, the behavior of inflation and 
output  is  different u nder inflation targeting and fear of 
floating. 
 
In the literature, the effect of a sudden stop on the output 
gap is negative. Uribe (2003) shows that the effect of spreads 
on output is negative. In an empirical investigation of the 
financial accelerator, Berganza, Chang and García (2003) show 
that the exchange rate has an effect on output that is 
negative. In turn, Calvo and Reihnhart (2000) consider a 
Keynesian and a liquidity effect to explain an effect of the 
exchange rate that is also negative. 
 
As for the reasons for this negative effect, take the private 
sector first. When balance sheets are vulnerable to an exchange   10
rate depreciation, an increase in the exchange rate decreases 
net worth. If net worth decreases, demand, and hence output, 
will likely decrease (Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci 2002 and 
Céspedes, Chang and Velasco 2000).  
 
Second, c onsider  also  the government. D oes  a sudden stop 
decrease public demand? If the exchange rate depreciates, the 
debt to GDP ratio will increase.  If debt is higher, demand 
plummets  and tax revenue falls. T he government is likely to 
adjust expenditure and pass tax reform. A sudden stop, thus, is 
likely to decrease public demand. 
 
In this paper, the output gap model includes t his  negative 
effect of a sudden stop  on demand. Bond spreads  were used  as 
proxy for net worth and they were included as an explanatory 
variable in the aggregate demand equation. Why not capture the 
negative effect  of net worth on aggregate demand  with the 
exchange rate? Because it was important f or our purposes  to 
separate the positive effect  of the exchange rate  on demand 




The model consists of  six  behavioral equations ( three 
estimated,  three  calibrated) and one identity.  Four linking 
equations close the system.  
 
                                                 
9 In a financially robust economy there would be no reason to split the 
effect of the exchange rate on net exports and on net worth. This is because 
the exchange rate would not have a negative effect on net worth. Also, in a 
financially robust economy there might have been no sudden stop.   11
The behavioral equations are: 
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The identity and the linking equations are: 
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where  t p  is the quarterly inflation at annual rate, 
4
t p  is the 
annual inflation, 
M
t p  is the import price inflation,  t p  is the 
inflation target,  t t | 6 + p  is the inflation forecast  for  six 
periods ahead , 
y
t z  is the output gap, 
r
t z  is the amount that the 
real interest rate deviates from the long term,  1 + t x  is the 
expected rate of depreciation,  t i  and 
*
t i  are the domestic and 
foreign nominal interest rates,  t j  is the risk premium, 
q
t z  is 
the deviation of the real exchange rate from equilibrium,  t q  is 
the real bilateral exchange rate with the US, and 
p et ,  
y
t e , and   12
M
t e  are shocks to supply, demand and import price inflation,  t q  
is the change in the real exchange rate,  t q  is the change in 
the long  term  measure  of the e xchange rate and 
*
t p  is US 
inflation. 
 
The Phillips curve (1) defines the dynamics of inflation. In 
this equation, inflation is determined by three factors. The 
first one is inflation expectations. The second one, the pass-
through from inflation in the price of imported goods. And the 
third one, the output gap. We required the coefficients on the 
nominal variables to add up to one so that in the long term, 
the natural rate hypothesis would hold. 
 
The aggregate demand  (2) is the equation  for the output gap. 
The gap has some persistence, and responds negatively to the 
interest rate,
 10 positively to the exchange rate and negatively 
to bond spreads. 
 
The reaction function  of the central bank  (3)  depicts  the 
behavior of the policy instrument. The nominal interest rate is 
a function of three terms. First, there is the lagged interest 
rate  (a smoothing component); s econd,  a term that for zero 
smoothing enables the equation to be understood either as a 
feedback mechanism in the nominal or in the real interest rate; 
and third, a feedback term in the inflation forecast.  
 
It was decided that the reaction function of the central bank 
should be calibrated for two reasons. First, the construction 
                                                 
10 All coefficients are nonnegative   13
of data on central bank inflation forecasts for the inflation 
targeting period would result in a sample that would be rather 
short for estimation. Second, we performed robustness checks on 
the specification of the reaction function of the central bank 
with no change in the qualitative implications of the paper. 
The results were robust to the forecast horizon and  to  the 
feedback and smoothing coefficients. 
 
The UIP condition (4)  determines  the nominal exchange rate. 
With high capital mobility, the expected rate of depreciation 
arbitrages the interest rate differential adjusted for a risk 
premium.  
 
A partial adjustment model (5) defines the first stage of the 
pass-through. While the first step of the pass-through is Eq. 
(5), the second step is coefficient c 2 in the Phillips curve. 
Here, we also required t he coefficients to add up to one to 
ensure super neutrality. 
 
A linear combination of backward and forward looking annual 
inflation (6) approximates inflation expectations. Given the 
short length of data for directly measured inflation 
expectations, our approximation enables the Phillips curve to 
be estimated for a larger sample. 
 
To model the transfer problem, the model may be extended with 
equations for exports and imports. Since a decrease in net 
worth would decrease demand for domestic and imported goods, 
imports would also depend on net worth. Net worth, again, can 
be approximated by bond spreads.    14
 
Overall, the model connects interest rate policy to inflation 
through three transmission channels. The aggregate demand 
channel: c5 – c3, the direct exchange rate channel: c11 – c2 , 
and the indirect exchange rate channel c 11  – c 6  – c 3.   The 
economy responds to interest rate policy, and, as dictated by 
the policy rule, interest rate policy responds to the economy.  
 
 
IV.  How to Characterize the Shock and the Policy Regimes 
 
Our first question  was h ow to  capture  a  sudden stop  in  the 
output gap model. The  output gap  model does not have an 
equation for the balance of payments,  only  an arbitrage 
condition for the return on capital at home and abroad. It is a 
model of flows, not stocks. We characterized a sudden stop as a 
price effect: just as a shortage of supply leads to a price 
increase, a shift in investor’s strategy against high yield 
increases bond spreads.
 Decreases in financial flows matching 




In the model, a sudden stop was characterized as an event that 
is exogenous. In fact, market sentiment can deteriorate in ways 
that are  completely unrelated  to the  fundamentals. Some 
                                                 
11 Perry, Suttle, Fiess (2003) also presented a negative relationship 
between gross capital inflow and bond spreads. 
12 We define capital inflows as gross amounts. We also exclude the items 
that have a longer term rationale, foreign direct investment and equity 
investment. In Asia, bank lending decreased before spreads increased. So, in 
this region, the graph also excludes bank lending and shows capital inflows 
as portfolio investment.   15
commentators claim that in June-July 2002 the emerging market 
bond spreads increased with the increase in the US high yield.
13 
Others emphasize the Wall Street “Lulometro” that  was  the 
strength of the then-candidate Lula in the election polls. But 
both  views  regard a sudden stop as an exogenous event.  In 
contrast, some currency crises are endogenous to balance sheet 
vulnerabilities -for example, government or bank over exposure 
to exchange rate depreciation. But the event that triggers the 
reversal in capital flows  could be regarded as exogenous; 
Rigobón (2003), for instance, has developed the effect of news 
in triggering currency crises.  
 
Our second question is how we can characterize fear of floating 
in a model where the exchange rate floats. Is there a way to 
model the exchange rate so that it is endogenous to UIP, but 
still shows fear of floating like behavior? We want the model 
to reproduce the macro behavior during the period of the rigid 
crawling bands with an exchange rate that floats. The reason 
for this is that  we want to derive conclusions  about policy 
analysis  that can be relevant  for the current period of 
inflation targeting.  
 
Is the solution to include the exchange rate in the reaction 
function? It could be, but that is not the option we take here. 
The literature that includes the exchange rate in the reaction 
function, (Taylor 2000, 2001, Ball 2000) still seems limited to 
the case of  the  industrial country, or  to the case  of a n 
emerging market that is financially robust. The reason is that, 
in this literature, the exchange rate has an effect on demand 
                                                 
13 This view is attributed to Guillermo Calvo.   16
that is positive.
14    Furthermore,  capturing fear of floating 
without touching the reaction function would be better on the 
grounds of simplicity. 
 
How  then  to characterize fear of floating?  It  was done  by 
decreasing  the inflation target. This  device  increases the 
interest rate and stabilizes the exchange rate.  Moreover,  an 
attempt to  characterize  fear of floating  without  requiring 
inflation to decrease would be inconsistent with the evidence 
that inflation fell after the sudden stops. 
 
Hence, a sudden stop under fear of floating was modeled here as 
an increase in the spread combined with a decrease in the 
inflation target. Again, as the inflation target decreases, the 
interest rate increases. The increase in the interest rate 
keeps  the exchange rate from increasing in a way that is 
consistent with fear of floating. The  inflation target was 
decreased by the number of percentage points that were 
necessary to roughly stabilize the real exchange rate.
15 
 
Overall, how  is a sudden stop modeled? Under inflation 
targeting,  it is modeled  as an  exogenous  increase in the 
                                                 
14 In any event, this literature concludes that in models that include the 
exchange rate in the reaction function, the variance of inflation and the 
output gap is somewhat smaller but not in a sense that is quantitatively 
important. 
15 Despite fear of floating, during the 1998-1999 period, exchange rates 
overshot and equilibrium exchange rates increased. In contrast, we aimed at 
a virtual stabilization of the exchange rate. This could be seen as a fear 
of floating that was too extreme, but our work horse for analysis was the 
comparison of extremes.    17
spread. And under fear of floating,  it is modeled  as an 
exogenous increase in the spread combined with a decrease in 
the inflation target. In both cases, the reaction function does 
not include the exchange rate and  the exchange rate is 
endogenous to UIP. 
 
V.  A Model for Potential Output and the Output Gap 
 
There are a myriad of methods to estimate potential output and 
the output gap. This time we choose to use, for the four 
countries of this study, a method that is suggestive of ongoing 
research for a broader set of countries. We set up a model that 
allows for a time varying growth rate of potential output, a 
model also  that  enabled us  to  split  country fluctuations  up 
into idiosyncratic, regional and international components. In 
building the model for potential output and the output gap, a 
local linear trend (Harvey 1989, Laxton 1998, Coates, Laxton 
and Rose 2003), and a DYMIMIC specification (Mody, Sarno and 
Taylor 2003) were combined.  Potential output follows the 
former, the output gap, the latter. The estimation of potential 
output and the output gap was carried out simultaneously with 
the Kalman filter. 
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where  i stands for the country, 
i
t y  is output 
i
t y  is potential 
output, 
i
t g  is the growth rate of potential, and 
j
t z , is the 
regional component of economic activity, and j  refers to Latin 
America and Asia, respectively. 
 
 
VI.  Results of the Estimation 
 
We estimated the model equation by equation because we wanted 
to acknowledge that the pass-through of import price inflation 
to CPI inflation has decreased. Hence in the estimation of the 
Phillips curve we use the Kalman filter and in the estimation 
of the aggregate demand and import price inflation equations we 
used OLS. 
 
To deal with the effect of the exchange rate and the spread on 
the output gap in the estimation, we took into account three 
factors. First, the exchange rate and the spread are not 
exogenous to each other. Second, the data seems to be dominated 
by the huge drop in output and the major devaluation in 1998-
1999. So, the estimations tend to pick an effect of the 
exchange rate on output that is negative. Third, the second 
consideration does not necessarily mean that the exchange rate 
did not stimulate net exports. On balance, the exchange rate 
was dropped from the estimation and the effect on demand 
through net worth was captured with bond spreads. In the 
simulations, we calibrated the coefficient of the exchange rate   19
as it appears in the column corresponding to the real exchange 
rate in Table 3.  
 
Before the results  of the estimation  for each equation are 
discussed, let us deal with the results of the estimation of 
the long term levels of exchange rates (Figure 6).
16 During a 
sudden stop, the real exchange rate overshoots and equilibrium 
levels of the real exchange rate increase.  
 
As to the estimation of the Phillips curve, the heart of the 
relationship between real and nominal variables,  coefficient 
c3,  is significant. Table 2 shows Kalman filter estimates of 
the Phillips curve.
  17 As the pass-through  was unstable, we 
allowed  a time varying pass-through c 2t. Table 2 reports the 
point estimate at the end of the sample,  which  is  the 
coefficient we use in the simulations. 
 
A result from the estimation of the aggregate demand equation 
is that  the effect of bond spreads on aggregate demand was 
higher  in Asia and output gap persistence in that region was 
smaller.  
                                                 
16 We estimated long term levels for the real exchange rate and the real 
interest rates and as local linear trends. 
17 The real-nominal relation was significant except in Brazil. Most 
estimates for Brazil belong to the period 1996-2002 instead of 1990-2002 as 
is the case in the other countries. This is because the end of the Real Plan 
constituted a clear regime change. In Brazil, the coefficient c3 was allowed 
to be time-varying and to follow a random walk. The variance of the error 
component of the random walk was calibrated to obtain a reasonable positive 
coefficient; this procedure, for the particular case of Brazil, amounts to a 
calibration.   20
 
When looking at  the e stimated coefficients  for the  equation 
dealing with  import price inflation,  we found  similar 
coefficients across countries. The results of the estimation of 
the equation for import price inflation are presented in Table 
4. 
 
As to the estimation of the output gaps, the 1998-1999 crisis 
produced higher output gap volatility in Asia. In addition, the 
crisis in Latin America took place with a lag (Figure 7).
18 
  
One other result bears emphasis, the 1998-1999 crisis seems to 
have decreased growth of potential output in the four countries 
under study, particularly in Colombia (Figure 7).
 19 
20 A time 
varying growth of potential  output  is one of the  appealing 




VII.  Simulation of a Sudden Stop in the Output Gap Model 
 
In this section, a sudden stop  is simulated  under the two 
alternative settings for monetary policy. Figures 9 to 12 
                                                 
18 As explained above, the four country model was estimated with the Kalman 
Filter recursion. A prior step was necessary to investigate the absolute and 
relative variances of the residuals that would result in output gap 
fluctuations of business cycle frequency. 
19 In the graph, we reported growth of potential output at annual rates. 
20 Growth projections for Thailand are more optimistic than suggested by the 
estimated growth of potential output. The local linear trend filter appears 
to be influenced by the strong recession in 1998.   21
compare the sudden stop shock under inflation targeting (solid 
line) and fear of floating (dotted line) in the four 
countries.
21 Consider central bank policy as indicated by the 
stance of interest rates  under the two  alternatives.  Under 
inflation targeting, interest rates fall; a stance that is 
counter-cyclical. U nder fear of floating, interest rates 
increase; they are pro-cyclical.  Fear of floating  keeps the 
exchange rate from depreciating but emphasizes and prolongs the 
recession.  
 
Inflation and output under inflation targeting 
 
The  sudden stop causes an immediate depreciation. C an the 
exchange rate depreciation jeopardize the inflation target?  Ho 
and McCauley (2003) would surely answer yes and would hint at 
the exchange rate as the first  suspect. Figures  9 to 12 show 
that a lthough  exchange rate depreciation causes a  sharp 
increase in import price inflation, it leads to a much smaller 
increase in CPI inflation.  The  final e ffect of the exchange 
rate on CPI inflation is small, but a large enough increase in 
the exchange rate may eventually jeopardize the inflation 
target.  
 
Is the increase in inflation  under inflation targeting 
relevant, or in other words, permanent? As the r eal exchange 
rate gradually decreases towards equilibrium, depreciation is 
negative and the pass-through quickly pushes inflation  down; 
                                                 
21 Rates of interest are presented in annual terms, rates of inflation and 
depreciation are defined annually. All variables are in deviation from 
steady state.   22
even below target. The central bank relaxes its stance. If the 
stance is loose,  economic activity eventually enters a boom, 
and the boom  increases  inflation toward  target.  So, the 
increase in inflation in the first year does not seem to be 
permanent. 
 
We claim that under inflation targeting monetary policy can be 
counter-cyclical. A s the exchange rate overshoots, expected 
depreciation is negative and domestic interest rates  may 
decrease.  The data does show some overshooting.  However,  it 
cannot be dennied, to say the least, that UIP is subject to 
considerable additive uncertainty.  In addition,  what if  the 
prescribed  decrease  in interest rates stimulated  the  capital 
outflow?  Counter-cyclical  monetary  policy  is not  a 
straightforward matter. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), and 
now our paper as well, open up the possibility for a counter-
cyclical policy –in theory. In practice, the reservations about 
the additive uncertainty in UIP (in the case of our paper) and 
about  the role of interest rates in maintaining market 
confidence,  may point to Brainard’s (1967) argument  for 
instrument stability. 
 
Inflation and output under fear of floating  
 
Figures 9 to 12 show that f ear of floating controls exchange 
rate pass-through  during the first year, but at  a cost:  a 
protracted recession.  Central bank pro-cyclical policy 
emphasizes the recessive effect of the decrease in net worth 
and the  increase in bond spreads.  A  deep and  protracted 
recession changes inflation permanently.    23
 
 
A capital inflow 
 
The model in this paper can also be used to explain inflation, 
output and policy under a capital inflow. During a capital 
inflow, t he exchange rate appreciates, import price inflation 
decreases,  the  output gap increases and inflation tends to 
increase.  Central banks face the  opposite dilemma: d efending 
the exchange rate from appreciating amounts to maintaining an 
expansive monetary stance. C ontaining  inflation requires  a 
tight monetary policy which stimulates the capital inflow.
22 
 
There are some  differences in modeling a capital inflow, 
however. First, the duration of the shock could be longer since 
capital inflows are generally persistent. In contrast, sudden 
stops are  big and short lived. Second, compared to a sudden 
stop, in a capital inflow the size of the change in the spread 
could be smaller  since spreads,  like interest rates,  have a 
lower limit. 
 
The cost of fear of floating 
 
Fear of floating decreases inflation,  and the decrease in 
inflation has a cost. T he cost is the sacrifice ratio. What 
then are  our estimates of the cost of fear of floating?  With 
the model in Section III, a permanent decrease in inflation of 
                                                 
22 For a description of the effects of an increase in capital inflows in the 
transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe see Lipschitz, Lane and 
Mourmouras (2002).   24
one percentage point was simulated. The sacrifice ratio is 2.5, 
1.1, 0.8 and 2.6 for Brazil, Colombia, Korea and Thailand.  
 
 
VIII. Policy Implications of a Sudden Stop 
 
In regards to the policy implications of the paper, we propose 
that under a sharp devaluation, central banks should focus on 
inflation after the shock.
23 While depreciation causes inflation 
in the very short term, monetary policy t ransmission 
mechanisms, especially the aggregate demand channel, take about 
two years to affect inflation sizably.  In the face of a n 
unanticipated event such as a sudden stop, the central bank is 
unable to attain the inflation target in the short term. 
 
Another consideration that must be taken into account in the 
political economy is the central bank’s communication strategy. 
A  central bank  that is targeting inflation  should  emphasize 
that inflation will go back to target after the first round of 
effects  of  the shock.  Emphasis  on the medium  term and the 
central bank commitment to the long term target could be the 
primary elements of the communication strategy. 
 
Another policy, proposed by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), 
is that the central bank could target inflation in the price of 
non traded goods. We think  a central bank that is  targeting 
inflation could complement the medium term alternative with the 
use of non traded goods inflation in the internal operations of 
                                                 
23 A similar proposal, an increased targeting horizon, is attributed to 
Frederik Mishkin.    25
the central bank. If the central bank takes  the price of non 
traded goods as the target index, it can ignore almost all open 
economy aspects,
24 and it is free to focus on output 
stabilization. The advantage of the use of non traded goods as 
the target index  is that it  prevents the central bank  from 
giving excessive attention to the effect of the exchange rate 
on inflation in the short term, and it enables the central bank 
to pay due attention to the behavior of inflation in the medium 
term and to counter-cyclical policy. The disadvantage is that a 
measure of non  traded  goods  inflation  would most likely be 
produced by the central bank itself and not independently by 
the statistics department. The cost in t ransparency, however, 
does not seem important compared with the significant gains in 
terms of preventing pro-cyclical policy. 
 
Finally, another possible policy would be to introduce  an 
escape clause for CPI inflation targeting under large 
depreciations.  In the model,  an  escape clause for current 
inflation would be immaterial  since the reaction function 
targets inflation six quarters ahead. But the political economy 
argument is that t he increase in inflation may tempt the 
central bank to “do something.” So, the escape clause can avoid 
the output sacrifice associated with fear of floating. 
 
IX.  Conclusions 
 
A prominent and recurrent shock to emerging market economies is 
a sudden stop. Sudden stops increase i nflation in the short 
                                                 
24 Except that real interest rates are usually defined on overall inflation 
instead of non traded goods inflation.   26
term and when combined with fear of floating seem to decrease 
inflation permanently. Sudden stops trigger an overshooting of 
the exchange rate and increase the equilibrium exchange rate. 
After  the  1998-1999  sudden stop,  growth of potential output 
seem to have decreased, especially in Colombia.  
 
As for the conduct of monetary policy during a sudden stop, in 
1998-1999, Brazil and Colombia managed interest rates pro-
cyclically. In 2002 the evidence is mixed: Brazil increased 
policy rates, Colombia did not. However, in  tightening the 
stance of monetary policy, Brazil must have followed, not the 
exchange rate, but the inflation target. 
 
The  effect of a sudden stop on inflation and output has been 
explained through the output gap model. The model showed that 
during a sudden stop, inflation targeting is counter-cyclical, 
and fear of floating, pro-cyclical.  According to the model, 
under inflation targeting, the recession in the first round of 
effects is followed by expansion. Under fear of floating, the 
recession is deeper and longer.  
 
Because the prolonged recession eventually becomes the output 
loss necessary to decrease inflation, the cost of fear of 
floating  has been identified with the sacrifice ratio.  Under 
fear of floating, by increasing the interest rate, a central 
bank would prevent inflation from increasing in the short term. 
This increase in the interest rate  would  at the same time 
deepen  the recession and decrease inflation permanently. 
Monetary policy would drive the economy to a permanent output 
loss and disinflation.    27
 
As to the policy implications of the paper, price stability and 
inflation targeting should not consist of keeping inflation on 
target at all times, especially under a sudden stop.
25 Under a 
sudden stop, central banks that are targeting inflation could 
focus on inflation in the medium term and may monitor a measure 
of inflation of non traded goods. Eventually in some cases an 
escape clause for CPI inflation under large depreciations would 
be welcome. 
 
Inflation targeting,  in theory,  enables the central bank to 
implement counter-cyclical policy.  It also appears to be a 
better policy  if inflation is in the low single digits:  if 
capital inflow stops when inflation is in the low single 
digits, fear of floating would add to the inflation outlook a 
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nFigure 5. Sudden stops (increase in net exports) and the business cycle
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Solid line: observed values, dotted line: long run values





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Figure 7. Output Gaps, Regional and Global Components





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gross capital inflows EMBI ThailandFigure 9. Sudden Stop in Brazil under Inflation Targeting and Fear of Floating


























































































1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41Figure 10. Sudden Stop in Colombia under Inflation Targeting and Fear of Floating
























































































1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41Figure 11. Sudden Stop in Korea under Inflation Targeting and Fear of Floating


























































































1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41Figure 12. Sudden Stop in Thailand under Inflation Targeting and Fear of Floating
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